“We beat you twice, and now you are here again”[1]: Thatcher, Kohl and Anglo-German diplomatic turbulence, 1989-1990.

Last month saw the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, a seismic geopolitical event leading to a speedy German unification. The peaceful revolution, or die Wende (‘the turning point’) in East Germany began in September 1989 in Leipzig, where crowds chanted ‘We are the people’[2] as Communist rule in East Germany disintegrated. Whilst a cause for celebration for many, the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, did not yield smooth Anglo-German relations as one might have expected.

The attitude of the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, towards German unification was infamously disobliging. She opposed a rapid German reunification seemingly on the grounds of a prejudicial, anti-German reading of twentieth century European history. Indeed, her Germanophobia and poor relationship with then West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, combined to threaten a messy unravelling of Britain and West Germany’s diplomatic relations in the winter of 1989. Whilst the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) own assessment of the period attempts to argue ‘that the British role in the process of German reunification was a positive and constructive one’[3], I would contend that this was not the case.

Source documents highlight that FCO diplomats did not, in winter 1989, greet the prospect of a speedy German unification enthusiastically. For example, Britain’s ambassador to West Germany, Sir Christopher Mallaby, mused in September 1989 that ‘I for one do not think that reunification is likely, in the foreseeable future, to be in British interests. Two pluralist Germanies with the FRG still in NATO, would certainly be preferable to a single, neutral Germany’[4]. On 6 October 1989, he described the prospect of German unification as the opening up of ‘Pandora’s box with a vengeance’[5]. Further, a draft FCO paper from 11 October 1989 posits that German unification would have numerous disadvantages for British interests in the realms of trade, power, and security.[6].

Despite this private concern, by early 1990 the FCO had grasped the importance of—publicly, at least—supporting German unification. On 18 January 1990, the Head of the FCO Policy Planning Staff, Robert Cooper, argued that ‘we need not only to anchor Germany in the West…but also to anchor ourselves firmly to Germany’[7]. By February 1990, FCO officials showed a clear understanding of the importance of Britain being perceived as supportive of German unification to retain influence within Europe. The West German Ambassador explained to the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, that ‘if we are seen as opponents of German unity, we shall have much less influence, because the Federal Government and public opinion will be disinclined to listen to us and Kohl would face domestic political costs if he was seen to do so’[8]. The FCO thus appeared to adopt a two-track strategy vis-a-vis German unification: to be publicly supportive of German self-determination but to work behind the scenes to provide scenarios of self-determination that would fall short of a united Germany that could dominate European and Western political, economic, and security institutions.

Mallaby noted in October 1990 that Thatcher was ‘essentially hostile to unification’[9]. She made little attempt to hide her anti-German hostility. In February 1990, Thatcher proclaimed that ‘to put it bluntly, we have to bear in mind—although not say— that we might one day need the Soviet Union as a counter-balance to a united Germany’[10]. Thatcher derided Germany both publicly and in private. In a September 1989 meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow, Thatcher blabbed that ‘Britain and Western Europe are not interested in the unification of Germany…we do not want the unification of Germany’[11]. These remarks were later relayed by Gorbachev to Egon Krenz, then the leader of the GDR, completing a rather extraordinary flow of diplomatic information from Thatcher to decision makers behind the Iron Curtain!

The Prime Minister’s attitude and actions prompted some panic among British political and diplomatic figures.. A dispatch from Pauline Neville-Jones, Minister at the British Embassy in Bonn, to the FCO on 13 February highlights how ‘the Prime Minister’s attitude to German unification is now attracting widespread criticism in the FRG press’, further noting that ‘damage is being done’[12]. The West German Ambassador, Mallaby, stated in a 22 February message to the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, that ‘when a strongly negative impression takes root, it is hard to shift it…This matters because it destroys our influence here. Your efforts…can bear full fruit only if our public standing is recovered’[13]. Thatcher had created a perception of British opposition to unity and adopted a hostile, aggressive approach to a united Germany, ensuring that Britain was unable to meaningfully influence the shape of German unification.

German unification became a largely German-directed affair; Britain was left in the cold. A phone call between Thatcher and George H. W. Bush in early 1990 so offended the then US President that he ‘had to take a walk to calm down’[14]. In the aftermath of Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, Thatcher’s whipping up of anti-German prejudices and the irritation it caused in Germany remain relevant for further academic research into Anglo-German relations since 1989, as well as Britain’s current and future relationship with Europe. Academic debate still rages as to whether Thatcher’s xenophobic approach merely isolated her from a British public that was experiencing a period of ‘Europhoria’[15], or whether in the longer term it has made the United Kingdom a spectator to ongoing European debates on the growing East-West divide on the continent[16]. Given that contemporary research has highlighted the importance of ‘cultural factors…and even rhetorical ones’[17] in continuing intra-European divides, it seems likely that inflammatory language about Europe and Germany used by British politicians in recent decades—exemplified in this post through Thatcher but sadly repeated by many public figures in the Brexit debate—has had a role to play in shaping public opinion in Britain. It is to be hoped that commemorative anniversaries such as this one provide an opportunity for more serious thought about Britain’s relationship with its European neighbours, and that current and future British governments take steps to repair Britain’s relations with both Europe and Germany.

Scott Lishak is a history PhD candidate in the School of History, Philosophy and Digital Humanities at the University of Sheffield. His research interests include social and cultural history of the German Democratic Republic, specifically, analysing the relationship between the monthly magazine, Das Magazin, and its readership.

References

[1] Luca Ratti, A Not-So-Special Relationship: The US, the UK, and German Unification, 1945-1990, (Edinburgh University Press, 2017), p.258. 

[2] ‘Ein Riß durch die Partei‘, Der Spiegel, issue 42, 15 October 1989, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ein-riss-durch-die-partei-a-39d757a1-0002-0001-0000-000013497940?context=issue  [accessed November 2024] 

[3] Richard J. Evans (2011), Review Article: ‘Documents on British policy overseas, series III, volume VII: German unification 1989–1990’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:3 (2011), pp.552-553. 

[4] Patrick Salmon et al., German Unification 1989-90: Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume VII (Taylor and Francis Group; 2010), document no.9 

[5] Ibid., document no.15 

[6] Ibid., document no.18

[7] Ibid., document no.102

[8] Ibid., document no.115 

[9] Ibid., document no.242

[10] Ibid., document no.140

[11] Record of Conversation between Thatcher and Gorbachev, September 23, 1989, Moscow: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB422/docs/Doc%207%201989-09-23%20Gorbachev%20Thatcher.pdf 

[12] Ibid., document no.142 

[13] Ibid., document no.151

[14] Robert Saunders, ‘Britain at the end of history’, New Statesman, (9-15 October 2020) https://web.p.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=0d812676-fc55-4862-a3e5-8355d7e359ac%40redis, [accessed 1 November 2024] 

[15] James Dennison, ‘Europhoria! Explaining Britain’s Pro-European Moment, 1988-1992’, Political Studies (2024), pp.1-26 

[16] Clara Volintiru, Neculai-Cristian Surubaru, Rachel A. Epstein & Adam Fagan, ‘Re-evaluating the East-West divide in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 31:3 (2024), pp.782-800 

[17] Ibid., p.785 

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